5 April, 2008
Basis of the war on moisture - feasible?
The prosecution case against eight alleged terrorists has finally revealed the nature of the threat which led to a global ban on liquids in air passengers' hand luggage.
Commenters at Bruce Schneier's blog, some of whom are professional chemists, have examined the credibility of assembling liquid explosives from the reported components, and of performing that task in-flight.
The conclusions seem to be that:
- In this instance the methodology was flawed, but it highlights a technique which others could use successfully. I'm sure there are people who'll mock this specific plot, and understandably so, but that's missing the point – the basic concept isn't ludicrous.
- That even the improved methodology would produce an explosive probably of insufficient potency to destroy a plane.
- That a minor but marginally credible risk has been massively overstated; that the handling of the risk is security theatre, more to do with authorities wanting to be seen to be doing something than about actually doing something worthwhile, but the risk itself isn't outright fantasy.
This also explains why I've been stopped by security officers interested in the number of 'AA' batteries I carry when travelling abroad (12 recyclables, for my camera), as it seems that's a way the chemical detonator could be smuggled aboard.
Ultimately, it seems to have been proved that the threat is possible. The core question is whether it's likely – whether it justifies a highly-visible worldwide 'war on moisture', or whether that policy is self-serving. That's still to be proven.
And no, I don't think "better safe than sorry" is adequate justification. By that argument, all passengers should be handcuffed and sedated for the duration of each trip.
Posted by Ministry at 08:18
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